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In a simple model with multiple pollutants, the first-best can be achieved either by a tax on each pollutant or equivalent permit price that reflects each marginal environmental damage. That is, the first-best requires each pollutant to be optimally regulated. Not all pollutants are regulated, however, and even regulated ones likely face suboptimal policy. The multiple pollutant setting creates complications for regulators: tightening rules on one pollutant changes how firms value other pollutants. Thus, a regulator concerned with social welfare who can change only one policy needs to account for changes across multiple pollutants. For example, policymakers who adopt a new carbon policy may not be able to adjust each regulation on other types of pollution, especially where different laws and jurisdictions govern the different pollutants.
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Our model is general enough to represent any industry with multiple pollutants that are substitutes or complements, so a price increase on one can induce firms to increase or decrease other pollutants. For example, Sigman (1996) studies chlorinated solvents used for metal cleaning and degreasing, and she finds that raised disposal costs for liquid chemical wastes may lead to more air emissions (i.e., substitutes).
2 Ren et al. (2011) find that reducing CO 2 by use of biofuel can increase nitrogen runoff from farms. Our numerical example below involves coal-fired electric power plants that emit both carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ). Agee et al. (2014) describe four ways these two pollutants could be substitutes or complements. 3 They "find that reducing NO X has substantially reduced SO 2 and CO 2 , while reducing SO 2 has substantially increased CO 2 " (p.66). Our illustration uses the U.S. EPA assumption that a carbon tax reduces use of coal and therefore both pollutants (i.e., complements).
A permit policy limits SO 2 from power plants under the U.S. Acid Rain Program (ARP), which has received much academic attention. 4 If CO 2 were to be regulated by a tax, then we expect a reduction in carbon emissions, but SO 2 permit prices may rise or fall depending on the degree to which carbon and sulfur are complements in production.
While some of the features of our model have appeared in prior literature, our paper is the first to combine all four of the following. First, we model analytically the general case where two pollutants can be complements or substitutes in production. 5 Second, not all pollutants are necessarily controlled by the same type of environmental policy. Indeed, one pollutant might be subject to a tax, while another is limited under a permit system. Therefore, we use a framework that can analyze multiple combinations of tax and permit policies. We show how doing so allows for a relatively easy comparison of policy scenarios available to regulators. 6 Third, environmental policies are likely to be suboptimal, where the marginal price per unit of pollution does not equal the marginal environmental damage. In a multiple pollutant setting, each policy regulating each pollutant is unlikely to be optimal for at least three reasons: technical limitations and informational constraints may preclude correct estimation of social costs and benefits; political concerns may prevent the adoption of a first-best policy; and, a pollution tax or price likely reflects conditions at the time of enactment rather than present or future conditions. Furthermore, multiple pollutants -even from a single source -are not necessarily all regulated by a single regulator using a comprehensive approach. Thus, we address situations where a regulator must choose a policy given existing regulations on other pollutants. 7 Fourth, a pollution tax or permit system is unlikely to cover all sectors. A carbon policy such as a tax or cap-and-trade system may cover more than just power plants, but it cannot cover all carbon emissions from all industrial, commercial, transportation, and residential sources. Existing estimates suggest that carbon policy can apply at most to 5 For examples of other models with multiple pollutants that could be complements or substitutes in production, see Moslener and Requate (2007) , Holland (2012b) , Ren et al. (2011) , and Agee et al. (2014) . 6 Ambec and Coria (2013) provide a recent theoretical contribution that simultaneously analyzes a mix of tax and permit policies, using a "prices vs. quantities" approach in the style of Weitzman (1974) for the case with a technological externality for abatement effort. The sign of their key technology parameter determines whether the pollutants are substitutes or complements. Our paper differs by using a general equilibrium approach with perfect certainty, and we do not solve for either first-or second-best results. Ambec and Coria (2013) rank the welfare outcomes of policy mixes, while we focus on the general equilibrium effects for a wide range of policy choices and settings.
approximately 80 percent of U.S. carbon emissions (Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009 Our analytical model has two sectors and two pollutants, where initial policy is suboptimal. Both sectors are competitive, with constant returns to scale production.
We employ standard assumptions that include full information, factor mobility, and certainty, but a less standard assumption is that one sector has three inputs: two kinds of pollution and a clean input. We refer to the clean input as labor, but it could represent labor, capital, or a composite of all clean inputs. For concreteness, our primary example is electricity generation that uses labor, SO 2 and CO 2 . With three inputs to production in the covered sector that faces an increased carbon tax, the elasticities of substitution between inputs become key model parameters. In addition, we assume that the other, uncovered sector employs two inputs, labor and carbon, where these carbon emissions face an unchanged price. Log-linearization allows us to evaluate policy changes.
Each pollutant in the covered sector could face a tax or permit policy, so we analyze four potential combinations. Our example for the tax-permit scenario is a tax on carbon with a permit policy on sulfur. We solve explicitly for the tax-tax and taxpermit scenarios, but the model is symmetric so the permit-tax and permit-permit scenarios are analogous. In these scenarios, we hold the sulfur policy constant and solve for effects of a small increase in the carbon tax. We find closed-form solutions, interpret them, and decompose them into output and substitution effects.
The tax-tax scenario provides important baseline results. Our simple closedform solutions characterize the conditions that guarantee particular outcomes (although perverse signs on outcomes can occur with extreme parameter values). In particular, the signs of elasticities of substitution are important. When the carbon tax is raised, holding the sulfur tax constant, then the covered sector's output falls (except in unusual cases identified below). When the two pollutants are substitutes, then SO 2 may rise or fall, but when they are complements then both effects act to reduce sulfur emissionswith positive effects on welfare.
The tax-permit results are more complicated than the tax-tax results, because the covered sector essentially has a fixed factor of production. Specifically, the closedform solutions in this scenario have a denominator with an ambiguous sign, unlike those in the tax-tax scenario. However, we show how to use the tax-tax scenario solutions to interpret both the numerator and denominator of the tax-permit solutions.
The results from the tax-tax and tax-permit scenarios highlight two important ways that environmental tax and permits differ in a model with perfect certainty. First, given a tax increase on one pollutant, its quantity change depends on whether the other pollutant is subject to a tax or a permit policy. At coal-fired power plants, for example, carbon abatement resulting from a 10 percent increase in carbon tax depends on whether SO 2 faces a tax or permit policy. Second, if SO 2 were subject to a tax, then its quantity can increase or decrease in a way that impacts overall welfare gains from the carbon tax increase itself. However, when the second pollutant is subject to a permit policy and that policy binds, then welfare does not change via spillover effects.
Our numerical exercise using historical data from 2007 helps demonstrate the two ways that taxes and permits differ in this paper. In the tax-tax scenario, a 10 percent increase in a carbon tax is found to decrease CO 2 emissions by 4.6 percent, and to decrease SO 2 by 0.9 percent. However, the same 10 percent carbon tax increase in the tax-permit scenario results in a smaller decrease in CO 2 emissions and zero change in the quantity of SO 2 (by definition). Despite the same tax increase in both scenarios, these differences in outcomes yield welfare gains in the tax-tax scenario that are more than twice the gains in the tax-permit scenario.
Section 1 below presents our basic model with multiple pollutants, and section 2 outlines our welfare analysis. Section 3 provides closed-form, analytical solutions for changes in endogenous variables, given exogenous changes in policy. Section 4 identifies plausible parameter values to calibrate the model. Section 5 uses those values for numerical results, and it conducts sensitivity analysis. Section 6 briefly concludes.
Model
We assume perfect competition, full information, mobile factors, many identical agents, lump-sum transfers, costless enforcement of policies, and perfect mixing of pollutants (i.e. no non-convexities or "hot-spots"). While both sectors face a positive price for carbon emissions from various existing energy policies, we model effects of a tighter carbon policy in a "covered" sector that does not apply to the uncovered sector. We compare only long-run equilibria and do not consider adjustment costs.
1.A Initial Setup
The covered sector produces output Y by a constant return to scale (CRTS) production
, where Y L is a productive resource called labor that could be a composite of all non-polluting factors (labor, capital, land, and technology). The representative firm pays a market-clearing price (p L ) for the composite labor input, and it emits both carbon (C Y ) and sulfur (S). 9 In sector Y, carbon and sulfur each face a tax or permit price, depending on prevailing regulation, so the firm pays a price p CY when emitting carbon and p S when emitting sulfur. The government returns all revenue from taxes or permit sales via lump-sum transfer to the representative household.
Good X is the other good, produced in the uncovered sector, which emits only carbon (C X ). Good X is produced by the CRTS production function
where X L denotes labor use. 10 Labor is undifferentiated, so the representative firm in sector X also pays p L per unit of labor. This sector does not face an explicit carbon policy, but it does face an implicit price of carbon (p CX ) from other policies such as a gasoline tax, BTU tax, or fuel-efficiency standards.
The binding resource constraint in this economy is given by
Here, a fixed total amount of labor is perfectly mobile between sectors X and Y, so leisure does not enter the utility function. In both sectors, all inputs are necessary for production and exhibit diminishing marginal returns. These conditions -along with regularity conditions on the consumer side -guarantee an interior solution.
In a generic utility function 
where R is the lump sum rebate of revenue from the government, viewed as fixed by the consumer but calculated as
1.B Log-Linearization
where
is the share of labor in production of good X and
. We use the "hat" notation throughout this paper to denote a proportional change in any variable ( )
.
Totally differentiate the production functions to show how final output changes when firms adjust input quantities:
where gi θ is the factor share of income for input i in the production of good g (e.g.
The zero profit conditions due to perfect competition are
Totally differentiate these equations and use the profit maximizing first-order conditions:
consumer heterogeneity, policies would have distributional effects. With firm heterogeneity, tradable permits would be more efficient than firm-specific quotas. With locational heterogeneity, different sources would have differential damages (e.g. Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) ). All of these interesting extensions are beyond the scope of the present paper, but are investigated elsewhere.
Good X has only two inputs, so factor use responds to changes in relative input prices via the elasticity of substitution, X σ . Differentiating the definition of X σ yields:
To handle three inputs to Y, we follow Allen (1938) , as in Mieszkowski (1972) .
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Define e ij as the Allen-elasticity of substitution between input i and input j. 
If e ij is positive, then the inputs are substitutes; if it is negative, they are complements.
Each input is a complement to itself ( i e ii ∀ ≤ , 0 ). The Allen-elasticities are symmetric, ji ij e e = , and at most one of the three cross-price elasticities can be negative.
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Finally, since pollution is separable in utility, we use U σ for the elasticity of substitution in utility between X and Y. Differentiation yields changes in demand behavior from a shift in output prices:
These nine linear equation are solved below for the equilibrium impacts of CY p , a small change in the covered sector's price of carbon.
14

Welfare Changes
Regulators in a multiple pollutant setting have the additional concern that changing regulation on one pollutant has general equilibrium effects that can change the quantity 12 Fullerton and Heutel (2007) 
, where λ is the marginal utility of income. In general, the welfare change -derived in Appendix B -is given by:
The left-hand side is the dollar value of the change in utility ( ) λ dU , divided by national income (I). Thus, it represents the percentage change in welfare (as in Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994, or Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001 ).
Consider the case where carbon is initially under-priced relative to its MED, such . Again, to evaluate final welfare changes would require values for parameters in the closed-form solutions derived in the next section.
15 15 Our simple model assumes perfect mixing, so a binding sulfur permit policy means no effect on welfare from any change in sulfur. More generally, of course, the policy may not be binding, and the carbon tax may change sulfur emissions. Even with binding sulfur permits, but without perfect mixing, the added carbon tax may cause a re-allocation of sulfur from low-to high-damage locations.
Analytical Solutions for a Change in Carbon Policy
Equations (1) - (9) are the linear system for general equilibrium effects of a small policy change. We define L as numeraire, so 0 = L p , and we hold the carbon price in sector X constant relative to that numeraire (as is necessary for the regulatory change not to apply to the uncovered sector). Thus CX p = 0, so equation (6) 
, so each policy scenario yields a linear system with eight equations and eight unknowns. Table 1 categorizes four possible scenarios, given two pollutants and two policy regimes for each pollutant. However, we explicitly solve and analyze only two of the four scenarios: the tax-tax case and the tax-permit case (with permits for S). The model's symmetry means that these two cases implicitly also solve the remaining two scenarios (the permit-tax and permit-permit cases). Thus, for the first column of Table   1 with a sulfur tax, the carbon tax case is functionally equivalent to the box below it with a carbon permit system. 16 Similarly, for the second column with a sulfur permit system, the effects of a carbon tax are functionally equivalent to the effects of a carbon permit. This symmetry highlights the fact that the type of policy on sulfur fundamentally determines how the covered sector reacts to the tightening restriction on 16 Given a sulfur tax, the case with 1% higher carbon tax that leads to a 2% change in carbon is equivalent to the case with a 2% change in carbon permits (which leads to a 1% increase in price).
carbon, regardless of whether that carbon restriction is a tax or permit policy.
17 
3.A Tax-Tax Scenario
The exogenous change in the tax-tax scenario is 0
(by substituting equation (3) into (5) and cancelling terms).
Thus, the price of Y always rises relative to the price of X (since 0 = . Perhaps surprisingly, the added carbon tax in Y might raise output. 18 We interpret the three terms in the brackets in equation (10) Alternatively, equation (10) Next, we solve for the change in the covered sector's carbon emissions:
The second term in this equation is the substitution effect. It is always negative,
; the higher carbon tax induces firms to substitute away from carbon.
The first term is called the output effect because it equals Yˆ from equation (10'). In general its sign is ambiguous, but only in very unusual cases would a carbon tax increase output in the covered sector. Therefore, C Y likely falls. ). Therefore, to guarantee 0 < Y , carbon and labor being substitutes is a more general condition than the pollutants being complements. Also, it might be easier to determine empirically whether C and L are substitutes, since L is often well measured.
20 Equation (11) can be inverted to yield the solution to the permit-tax scenario (where carbon gets a tighter permit policy, while sulfur is subject to a tax): (12) is used below. Equations (12) and (13) have forms similar to (11). The output effect is the same in all three equations (and it is negative except in unusual cases, as discussed). The substitution effect in (11) has a clear sign (because CC e < 0), but the substitution effects in equations (12) and (13) 
(because consumers substitute away from Y). (13') says that L Y must fall, unless labor and carbon are more substitutable in production than the two goods are substitutable in utility. ). With CRTS, proportional changes in both inputs means the same proportional change in output, and leakage here is:
In summary, these closed-form solutions highlight how the signs of endogenous outcomes are determined by cross-price elasticities that need to be estimated. We show how an increase in the carbon tax decreases carbon emissions in the covered sector (except in unusual cases where covered sector output rises). The same carbon tax may or may not raise sulfur emissions when the pollutants are substitutes, but it reduces SO 2 when the pollutants are complements (except in unusual cases with more output). The amount of labor used in the covered sector falls, unless labor and carbon are more substitutable in production than the goods are substitutable in consumption.
3.B Tax-Permit Scenario
If a tax is levied on carbon while sulfur is subject to a permit policy, then 
This equation merely switches the roles of C Y and S in equation (11) above (instead of finding the effect on carbon from a change in carbon tax, it show the effect on sulfur from a change in the sulfur tax). The reason for that digression is that we can use it to show the effect on sulfur price from a change in carbon tax: 
where A is the coefficient from equation (12) in the tax-tax scenario.
The change in sulfur permit price has an ambiguous sign, and equation (16) initially appears complicated relative to solutions in the tax-tax scenario, because it contains four different Allen-elasticites and a denominator. While D is not necessarily negative, a strong enough substitution effect in equation (15) would likely mean that an increase in the sulfur tax decreases the sulfur quantity (in that other tax-tax scenario).
Closed-form solutions for the other endogenous variables in the tax-permit scenario have the same denominator as equation (16), so for purposes of discussion we focus on the "normal" case where 0 < SS e is large enough to ensure that D is negative.
In the numerator (A) of the tax-permit scenario in (16) 
where the denominator is the same as in equation (16) 
where (18) 
It has a form like equation (19), but with some of the elasticity parameters switched. given a sulfur price change. Finally, as in the tax-tax scenario, carbon leakage in sector X is given by the recursive equation
Overall, compared to the tax-tax scenario, we find that the tax-permit scenario has more ambiguous outcomes that depend on parameter values, since sector Y has a fixed-factor of production (S). As in the tax-tax scenario, however, we can still decompose the changes to input variables ( Y Ĉ and Y L ), into output and substitution effects. In the end, we still highlight the intermediate conclusion that the cross-price elasticities need to be estimated.
Parameter Values
This section provides parameter values for a numerical illustration that uses equations above to solve for endogenous outcomes and welfare. Analytical expressions in section 3 are complex, with ambiguous signs in many instances, so this calculation can help determine both signs and magnitudes. The covered sector in this example is all of U.S. electricity generation, which emits both CO 2 and SO 2 and which can substitute away from carbon in the long run by switching from coal to natural gas or wind power.
We note that the price of sulfur permits has recently fallen to zero in the U.S., but we wish to illustrate our model for positive pollution prices, so we calibrate the model to emission data and economic data from the year 2007. Also, our simplified analytical model does not capture all possible effects of a carbon tax in general equilibrium, such as in a computational model with explicit fuel markets. It is therefore not a "forecast" of actual effects from a carbon tax, but merely an illustration of analytical results above.
4.A Benchmark Levels
The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts ( 
See Next, these levels are converted into the share parameter values used in the loglinearized equations (1)- (9), and hence in the closed-form solutions. For example, 
4.B Allen-Elasticities
Equations (7)- (8) (Ross, 2008) . 25 Tol (2009) 
4.C Other Parameters
5.A Results with Primary Parameters
Our numerical results appear in Table 4 . Column (1) reports results for the tax-tax policy scenario, where the carbon tax increases by 10 percent, and an SO 2 tax remains constant (so CY p is 0.10 and S p is zero by assumption; those entries are shaded grey).
As a result of this policy change with primary-case parameters, covered CO 2 emissions fall by 4.6 percent, and SO 2 emissions fall by almost one percent. As the carbon price increases, complementarity between pollutants ( )
leads to the decline in SO 2 (-0.90). Producers increase their use of the clean input, a result expected from the substitutability between carbon and labor ( )
. Next, the price of good Y increases by slightly more than one percent, and output of Y falls by 0.27 percent.
Since production of X retains an unchanged ratio of inputs, the increase in Y L means that both X L and X Ĉ must fall. Thus, the tax on CO 2 in sector Y cuts carbon in both sectors. Leakage is slightly negative with primary-case parameters. 27 Carbon pollution can fall in both sectors because carbon has no binding constraint; decreasing its use in one sector does not necessitate increasing its use in the other sector. As a result of the policy change, overall welfare improves by 0.59 percent, which is a utility increase worth $8.13 billion per year. The welfare gain is almost evenly split between gains from carbon reduction in the covered sector (0.287 percent) and SO 2 reductions (0.302 percent). The reduction in carbon emissions of the uncovered sector is small and adds little to welfare. Interesting is the fact that this added carbon tax raises slightly more welfare from SO 2 reduction than from CO 2 reduction.
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However, if both MED's are really only half of the size measured by Tol (2009) and Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) , then the welfare gains fall by more than half (see Table 4 panel C). For example, halving the MEDs for the tax-tax scenario leads to a 27 Intuition for the negative leakage result in Baylis et al. (2014) is simple: a carbon tax can induce firms to use more clean inputs per unit of output, and thus draw resources away from the other sector, which reduces the other sector's output and emissions. The same mechanism operates in this model. Welfare is affected disproportionally by a larger social cost. Table 4 column (2) reports primary results for the tax-permit scenario with the carbon tax increase of 10% and holding fixed the permit policy on sulfur. Here, sector Y's decrease in carbon emissions is only slightly lower than in the tax-tax scenario.
However, the welfare gain is only 0.285 percent -approximately half of the gain in the tax-tax scenario -because sulfur is fixed in the tax-permit case. Meanwhile, the sulfur price falls. This column numerically demonstrates how effects of the carbon tax on carbon emissions depend on whether the policy on sulfur is a tax or permit policy. Table 4 column (3) matches the change in sector Y's carbon emission across the two policy scenarios. Here, the tax-permit scenario needs a larger carbon tax increase (10.06%) to reach the same 4.59% reduction in carbon emissions as in the tax-tax scenario. 29 Table 4 column (4) sets the carbon tax increase in tax-permit scenario to match the welfare gains of the tax-tax scenario; we find that this tax rate increase would need to more than double (20.7% rather than 10%).
30 Table 5 decomposes the input variables ( )
from Table 4 into output and substitution effects, using the analytical expressions in section 4. In column (1), for example, the change in carbon in sector Y is -4.59%, with -0.27 percentage points coming from the output effect and -4.32 percentage points coming from the substitution effect. The output effect for each cell in Table 5 is just the value of Yˆ from the corresponding column in Table 4 (so the output effect is constant within each column).
Since the decomposition is linear, the remainder must be the substitution effect.
While the levels of the output and substitution effects are important, we find the ratio of the two effects to be quite informative. First, for Y Ĉ , note that the ratio of the 29 Interestingly, even with a higher tax rate, the tax-permit scenario has a smaller output effect compared to the tax-tax scenario (-0.26% vs. -0.27%). It is offset by a larger substitution effect.
30 When both pollutants face taxes, a higher carbon tax gets about half of its welfare gain from the 0.9% sulfur reduction (Table 4 column (1)). Thus, SO 2 policy is suboptimal, and we could ask about effects of reducing sulfur directly. From the same benchmark, when we hold the carbon tax constant and suppose that the number of sulfur permits is reduced 0.9%, the effect is almost no reduction in carbon emissions and approximately half the welfare gains of column (1). Alternatively, to match column (1) welfare gain with no change in the carbon tax would require nearly doubling the SO 2 cap reduction to -1.74 percent.
substitution effect to the output effect is 16.18 in column (1) but rises to 16.62 in columns (2) -(4). This result is expected, given that the fixed sulfur input in the taxpermit scenarios keeps output from falling as much as in the tax-tax scenario. Second, the ratio for Y Ĉ is the same in three columns (2) - (4), as expected from the model's linearity. Third, the ratio for Y L is the same across all models. Decomposition of output and substitution effect helps to understand the numerical outcomes. ( )
( )
( ) 
5.B Sensitivity
Whether the two pollutants are substitutes or complements drives many of the empirical results. Thus, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by varying the parameter SC e from -2 to 2 along the horizontal axis in three figures for the tax-tax scenario. When varying Finally, we observe that the primary-case parameterization leads to some numerical outcomes that do not differ much between the tax-tax and tax-permit scenarios. In the first two columns of Table 4 , for example, the output change in sector Y is -0.27% in the tax-tax scenario and -0.26% in the tax-permit scenario. Similarly, the change in carbon emissions from sector Y is -4.59% in the tax-tax scenario and -4.56% in the tax-permit scenario. These small numerical differences are due to the small input shares for sulfur and carbon in sector Y (in contrast, note that welfare changes for these two scenarios differ more: 0.589% vs. 0.285%).
Therefore, we conduct sensitivity analysis on these pollution share parameters in Table 6 . Column (1) repeats the primary-case from Table 6 column (2) shows greater differences between the two scenarios when the sulfur share is larger. the numerator of all the closed-form expressions. 32 Finally, Table 6 column (4) doubles both the sulfur and carbon shares. These results combine the greater differences from column (2) with the greater magnitudes in column (3) to get numerical results that have larger absolute differences than any of the other three columns.
Conclusion
In order to solve analytically for all price and quantity outcomes in general equilibrium, this paper builds a two-sector model of a closed economy using standard assumptions of perfect competition, constant returns to scale, mobile factors of production, and perfect
certainty. Yet we consider two pollutants in the covered sector that may be complements or substitutes, where either pollutant maybe controlled by a tax or by a permit system. We find closed-form solutions that show general equilibrium outcomes for any parameter values, and we provide intuition for our results.
The paper highlights two important ways that pollution taxes and permit policies are not equivalent. First, the quantity change for a pollutant subject to a tax increase depends on whether the other pollutant faces a tax or permit policy. Second, if that other pollutant pays a tax, then general equilibrium effects can increase or decrease its quantity and impact overall welfare. However, when the second pollutant is subject to a permit policy, and that policy binds, then welfare does not change via spillover effects.
The model is general enough that it can be applied to many multiple pollutant problems within and across media. As an example, we conduct a numerical analysis of the U.S. electricity sector that emits carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide from burning coal. Our most plausible parameters reflect the U.S. EPA assumption that CO 2 and SO 2 are complements across the entire sector, and so a tax on CO 2 increases welfare by reducing both pollutants within the covered sector. The numerical exercise helps demonstrate the two ways that environmental taxes and permits differ in a general equilibrium model with multiple pollutants and initially suboptimal policies.
32 Despite these larger differences between columns (1) and (3), the differences within column (3) between the tax-tax scenario and the tax-permit scenario are similar to the difference within column (1).
Appendix A: Factor Demand Responses in Sector Y
Here, we derive equations (7) and (8), describing the input demand responses to changes in input prices. Define the input demand functions from cost minimization:
Next, totally differentiate each input demand function.
dY Y L dp p L dp p L dp p
C dp p C dp p C dp p
S dp p S dp p S dp p
, and S, respectively, and rearrange.
Constant returns to scale production implies that the input demand functions are
, and
. Next, the equations can be rewritten using the "hat" notation as: Finally, because these equations are not independent, subtract the third from the first and second, respectively, to eliminate Yˆ, and rearrange using the symmetry of the Allen-elasticities ( ) ji ij e e = to yield equations (7) and (8).
Appendix B: Derivation of the Welfare Equation
Totally differentiate the utility function:
Substitute in the first-order conditions (FOCs), 
Continuing, totally differentiate the resource constraint using
The profit maximizing FOCs in sector X are projections for a simplified version of the proposed cap-and-trade legislation. 33 We run a simple regression to "estimate" SC e , using these price and quantity projections as if they were data. This regression is not based on any observed behavior in response to price changes; it is only meant to summarize all of the EPA assumptions in the form of our single SC e parameter. To proceed, integrate the definition of SC e to obtain: constant, and therefore we control for output when we linearly regress this equation 33 See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/economicanalyses.html for this EPA analysis. using the data in The standard errors from this regression are misleadingly low, because the EPA's modeling and projections are deterministic. Our procedure here does not yield any statistical properties; it only summarizes the EPA's assumptions about the many unknown parameters and the chosen model structure. The actual "estimate" of the elasticity is approximately -0.62, but we simply use -0.6 to avoid unwarranted claims of accuracy in this estimation.
35 Blackory and Roberts (1989) can be used to show that the Morishima-elasticity of substitution for quantity i and price j, ij m , is related to the Allen-elasticity of substitution by the algebraic identity Proof: Blackorby and Roberts (1989) 
